Tuesday, November 13, 2012

[Victims of Court Corruption] Strike Zero - You're Out! by Ron Branson

Strike Zero - You're Out!
By Ron Branson

Scott Huminski, it appears that the 9th Cir. is now adopting the very same Modus Operendi as is employed by the U.S. Supreme Court, i.e. denying review without opinion. A I received was first a form letter from the Clerk of the Court stating intent to affirm the judgement below based upon the conclusion that the issues presented were insubstantial. But all that transpired was that I paid  $455 for the Notice of Appeal and five days later I received the form letter from the Clerk of the Court.

Thereafter, I received a letter with three judges signed thereon that the appeal of the judgement of the court below was sustained based upon my Opening Brief. But there was no Opening Brief nor was there even a Record on Appeal. All I got was stiffed of $450, and they didn't even use a gun.

Then it was off to the Supreme Court where not a thing was said about my being denied a opportunity to prepare and file an Opening Brief and argue my case.

I guess this is now standard operational procedure for the 9th Cir. to not allow Opening Briefs or questions on Appeal. As I said illustratively, it is like being called up to bat, and you grab your bat and approach the plate and await the pitch when the umpire yells, "You're Out!"

Ron Branson

-------- Original Message --------
It would save everyone a lot of trouble if the 9th Cir stated its practice of hearing appeals on a discretionary basis rather than issuing bogus rulings stating the issues are insubstantial in a form letter.

The Vermont supremes were right on with the below.

In The

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit


Scott Huminski, Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                                                        v.                                 Docket No. 12-17225

Mercy Gilbert Medical Center,

Dignity Health, et al., Defendants – Appellees.


      NOW COMES, Scott Huminski ("Huminski"), and moves to clarify the final opinion/ruling in this matter to specify the findings of law to allow the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to set forth the law of this case that is in conflict with the law adopted by the full Vermont Supreme Court in Huminski v. Lavoie, 173 Vt. 517 (Vt. Supr. Ct. 2001, Docket No. 99—330) (en banc) and authority cited therein.  The insubstantial final opinion entered in this matter does not adequately set forth facts or law sufficient for a meaningful review by the United States Supreme Court.



The Court should state with specificity the rejection of the logic set forth in Huminski v. Lavoie and cases cited therein from the Second Circuit, Sixth Circuit and Seventh Circuit federal Courts of Appeals and from the en banc Vermont Supreme Court.  This appeal involves a sua sponte District Court opinion denying an injunction without allowing time for the parties to respond to arguments sua sponte proffered by the District Court.  The authority rejected by this Court from Huminski v. Lavoie is as follows:

“Through this traditional adversarial process, a complete record is produced, and the pertinent legal and factual issues are crystallized for review on appeal.  Judicial economy is thereby served.  In contrast, sua  sponte dismissals without adequate notice to the parties tend to short-circuit the process, and ultimately to prolong the proceedings and squander judicial resources.  See Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797 (2d  Cir. 1988) (noting that sua sponte dismissals may "tend to produce the very effect they seek to avoid - a waste of judicial  resources"); Tingler  v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1111 (6th Cir. 1983) (lack of record resulting from sua sponte dismissal hampers arguments on appeal and "results in the waste of judicial resources").  

 As other courts have observed, sua sponte dismissals are also disfavored because they cast the judge in the role of "'a proponent rather than an independent entity.' " Perez, 849 F.2d at 797  (quoting Doe v. St.  Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also Lewis v. New York,  547 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir. 1976). We note that courts should be particularly careful to avoid this perception in cases involving pro se  plaintiffs.” (emphasis added)


Dated at Naples, Florida this 13th day of November, 2012.          

/s/ Scott Huminski


Scott Huminski, pro se

P.O. Box 10224

Naples, FL  34101



                        I hereby certify that on this 13th day of November 2012, copies of this


paper were served upon parties of record.

                                                                                    /s/ Scott Huminski


            Scott Huminski


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